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Abstract
I consider a risk averse and prudent social planner who has access to dierent energy
sources to produce electricity: hydroelectricity produced with a dam and thermal electricity
with unlimited supply at some exogenous cost. The dam is supplied with a random water

ow. The presence of constraints on a minimal and on a maximal storage capacity makes
electricity consumption smoothing possible only when the quantity of water available to the
agent lies in a certain range that I determine. Consumption smoothing is possible even
when the dam is almost empty thanks to the alternative costly energy source. Moreover a
comparative static analysis reveals that the marginal propensity to produce hydroelectricity
is an increasing function of the cost of the second technology. Therefore, the availability at a
low cost of the fossil source improves time diversication. Finally, the optimal electric park
is composed of a number of dams that is increasing with the cost of the second technology.
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11 Introduction
The aim of this work is to determine the optimal structure of an electric park that generates
power with dierent energy sources. To preserve the environment and energy sources that are
exhaustible, governments are increasingly concerned with the use of renewable energy sources
besides classic thermal power sources. However, renewable energy sources are not easy to use
as their availability is not constant over time. Therefore, an electric park must be designed by
taking into account this random availability and its management has to solve the problem of
providing enough electricity even when renewable sources are not available in the short run.
Norway, for instance, is the sixth largest hydropower generator in the world and the biggest
in Europe. Hydropower accounts for 99% of the electricity generated and annual production
varies to a great extent in line with precipitation levels. Thus when the country faces dry periods
as it was the case in 2002 and 2003, hydropower reservoirs work as buers between output and
consumption. Besides hydropower, electricity is also generated from sources such as natural gas
and wind. Indeed, \gas-red power station" can be started up and closed down at short notice.
They are suitable for providing peak-load power but have a relatively high cost. In fact, during
dry periods, the loss of hydropower output is oset by increasing thermal power generation.1
In this work, I focus on two energy sources. The renewable energy source has a random
availability whereas the thermal power source is available at an exogenous market price. The
possibility to store the renewable energy source in a dam allows to smooth consumption over
time. During a dry episode, some of the water stored in the dam is consumed and the water
reserve goes down, potentially to the lower limit of the reservoir. In that case, electricity
consumption may be limited or rationed. On the contrary, when the water in
ow is higher,
the dam is replenished potentially up to the maximum capacity of the reservoir. Therefore, the
dam's capacity is a key factor of the optimal management policy as the Norwegian example
illustrates. Besides this renewable energy source, the permanent availability of thermal power
softens the eect of uncertainty of the water in
ow.
A large body of literature concerning commodity storage presents meaningful results. Williams
and Wright (1982, 1984) developed a model where supply is stochastic and where production
and storage are performed by competitive prot maximizers. They found that \storage is much
more eective in eliminating excessive levels of consumption and low prices than in prevent-
ing low levels of production and high prices". They explained this result by evoking the non
symmetry of storage. Indeed, storage has to be non negative meaning in this case that wa-
ter cannot be \borrowed" during a drought. Deaton and Laroque (1992, 1996) also worked
on the topic of commodity prices and commodity storage. In the second paper, they tried to
explain some stylized facts of commodity price behavior by tting a competitive storage model
directly to the data. They proposed two ways to model productivity shocks: either iid shocks or
time dependent (autoregressive) shocks. But nally none of the two models ts the data well.
Deaton and Laroque explained this failure as follows: \all the autocorrelation in the data has
to be attributed to the underlying processes. Although speculation is capable of increasing the
autocorrelation that would otherwise exist in an unmoderated price series, it cannot raise it to
the levels that we observe".
The literature dealing with the use of energy sources has expanded in many directions.
1See Ministry of Petroleum and Energy of Norway (2004).
2Garcia et al. (2001) analyzed the price formation process and its policy implications in an
innite horizon duopoly model. They focused on two hydroelectricity producers who engage
in dynamic Bertrand competition. At each date, water reservoirs are replenished with some
strictly positive probability and a price cap aects the opportunity cost of producing electric
power. They found that hydroelectricity producers might sell less today to have more capacity
tomorrow: they adopt a strategic pricing behavior. They explained that the introduction of a
price cap may shift down the entire price distribution. Crampes and Moreaux (2001) studied
a model where two energy sources are available: hydroelectricity and thermal electricity. They
focused on a model of two time periods and did not introduce uncertainty in the hydroelectric
technology. They studied the case of a central planner, of a monopoly that is regulated or not
and the case of Cournot competition. They concluded that in the presence of hydroelectricity,
thermal plants have to be dynamically planned. Moreover the optimized output for the thermal
station is determined by the intertemporal specication of utility and costs. Hotelling (1931)
studied the dynamic pricing of a non-renewable and exhaustible natural resource and he found
that, in the competitive case without stock externality, the price of this resource must grow at
a rate which is equal to the interest rate of the nancial market. Extended to the problem of
a social planner who have to determine the optimal use of the resource, this rule implies that
the optimal consumption declines over time at a rate corresponding to the ratio of the social
discount rate and the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption. Optimality also requires
that the resource must be exhausted asymptotically. As Heal (1993) noted in his review on the
optimal use of exhaustible resource, many extensions to this initial model have been explored.
Hoel (1978), for instance, introduced uncertainty in a setting with two energy sources: the date
when the substitute will become available is known, but its unit cost is uncertain. He found that
an increase in uncertainty may increase the consumption depending on the shape of the utility
function. Ayong Le Kama (2004) studied the use of a unique energy source under uncertainty
in a nite horizon model. He found that introducing two types of constraints, one on the
availability of the resource and another on the agent's solvency, modies the agent's behavior.
To determine the optimal consumption, the agent takes into account the energy stock but also
his anticipations on the realizations of future shocks. In the fties, dierent authors addressed
the question of minimizing dispatch cost in a hydrothermal system. Little (1955) determined the
optimal water management in an uncertain setting close to the one I use, but he did not focus on
the way an electric park is valued. Two years later, Koopmans (1957) developed a model with
two energy sources without uncertainty and aimed at determining the optimal water storage
policy that minimizes the operating cost of thermal generation. In a second step, he tried to
obtain the value of the power generated and of the water used and/or stored.
A parallel can be drawn between a dam that contains water and the savings of an agent
and between the water 
ow that enters a dam and the random revenue of the agent. In models
focusing on agents' consumption/saving behavior, agents are usually assumed not being allowed
to borrow at each time period. Without such liquidity constraints, agents would perfectly smooth
their consumption over time. But with liquidity constraints, agents are not able any more to
use an anticipated increase in their revenue in the future by increasing today the amount they
are allowed to borrow. The introduction of such constraints decreases thus consumption even if
they are not binding. Agents are indeed afraid of not being able to borrow. Such models have
been studied by Deaton (1991), Zeldes (1989), Carroll (1997) and Gollier (2001).
3In this article, I aim at determining the optimal electric park that generates power with
two energy sources. I dier from the initial Hotelling model since the exhaustible resource is
potentially renewable as it is regularly replenished with an uncertain 
ow. The analysis concerns
the optimal management of random stocks. I consider the optimal allocation between two energy
sources as Crampes and Moreaux (2001). However, two main features have been added: not
only do I consider an innite horizon model, but I also introduce uncertainty on the water in
ow.
A social planner chooses the energy production at each period depending on the state of the
system and his expectations on its evolution. He maximizes the discounted sum of the expected
utility he gets from the use of dierent energy sources. In a rst step, the optimal production

ow when only hydroelectricity is available is analyzed. Hydroelectricity generation comes from
water stored in a dam that is supplied with a random in
ow. Unlike Ayong Le Kama (2004), I do
not consider any solvency constraint since future water in
ows are assumed to be always positive.
However, I add a second constraint on the availability of the resource since it must be nite.
Therefore, a second kind of \liquidity constraint" is introduced: not only is the social planner
unable to produce electricity from water not yet fallen in the reservoir, but it is also not possible
to store more water in the dam than its capacity. I nd that the management of the dam allows
electricity smoothing when the quantity z of available water is in a given range [z;z] that I
determine. Indeed in this region, the social planner prefers cutting down on total consumption
today to let enough water in the dam for the future. But when the quantity of available water
is too low (lower than some threshold z), it is completely consumed since the social planner
expects future rainfalls will replenish the dam. A second energy source is then added and the
optimal combination between the two energy sources allows for a better smoothing of electricity
consumption even when the dam is full and the costly energy source is not consumed. Moreover
the introduction of the second energy source shifts up water production. Besides the analysis of
the allocation between the two sources, I consider the eect of an increase in uncertainty of the
water in
ow. For some values of the quantity of available water, more water is consumed under
uncertainty than under certainty. Once the optimal allocation has been determined, I consider
a long term situation where the characteristics of the electric park have to be determined. I
compute the optimal number of dams and nd that it is an increasing function of the price of the
alternative energy source. Lastly, as an extension, I focus on the eciency of time diversication
when a second random energy source is introduced that is non storable.
In the next section of this article, the model is presented. A benchmark case is studied in
section 3 when the water in
ow is constant. Section 4 is devoted to the resolution of the model
in a general setting. Section 5 deals with the characteristics of an optimal electric park in the
long term. In section 6, I propose as an extension to introduce a third energy source that is
uncertain and non-storable. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
I consider a small economy in which a social planner produces electricity using two dierent
technologies: hydroelectric energy and thermal power. Hydroelectricity is obtained from water
extracted from a dam. The dam is supplied with a random water 
ow e yt and is characterized
by its capacity Z. Thermal power is available at any time at a constant exogenous market
4price.2 In this setting, hydroelectricity is a renewable resource whereas the relative scarcity of
thermal power is expressed in its price: there is no constraint on its availability given its market
price. Therefore, thermal power is a backstop technology of hydroelectricity in the sense used by
Nordhaus (1979) and Heal (1993): \a technology that can provide substitutes for the resource
once it is fully depleted, and can provide these substitutes on a very large scale indeed".
I consider a setting where a social planner chooses at each period the energy production
depending on the state of the system and his expectations on its evolution. He aims at maxi-
mizing the expected intertemporal utility he gets from the 
ow of future production. The use
of the dam introduces constraints. On the one hand, consumption is restricted by the quantity
of stored water in the dam, but on the other hand, water consumption has to be high enough
since the quantity of stored water is bounded by the dam capacity Z. As for thermal power,
the only constraint is a non-negativity one. I introduce
- wt the amount of water in the dam at the beginning of period t,
- e yt the random 
ow of water that enters the reservoir,
- zt the total amount of water that is available to the agent in period t, that is zt = wt + e yt.
This implies that zt  min e y 8t,
- ct the amount of water that is extracted from the dam in period t,
- Z the dam capacity. wt, zt, ct and Z are measured in cubic meters and refer to volumes
of water in the reservoir. I assume min e y < Z,
- xt the quantity of electricity produced with thermal power consumed in period t and
measured in kWh,
- p the unit price of thermal power,
- R the conversion coecient of a water volume into a quantity of produced electricity in
kWh. It depends on the characteristics of the dam (its height, its 
ow),
-  the discount factor with  < 1,
- u the utility function: it is strictly increasing and strictly concave.
The timing is represented in Figure 1.
The dynamics of water available to the social planner satises zt+1 = zt   ct + e yt+1. Water
consumption is bounded by the quantity of available water, Therefore, the rst constraint reduces
to ct  zt. Finally, the remaining stock of water should not exceed the dam capacity: wt+1  Z.







t [u(Rct + xt)   pxt] (1)
2In this setting of a competitive market for thermal electricity, the price corresponds to the marginal cost.
5wt t y ~   ct wt+1 1
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zt+1 = zt   ct + e yt+1; (2)
ct  zt; (3)
ct  zt   Z; (4)
ct  0; (5)
xt  0; (6)
z0 given. (7)
I choose a CRRA utility function where the concavity coecient 
 equals the inverse of the







I assume moreover that 
 > 1. Before solving the model, a rst result on the shape of both
consumption 
ows follows.
Proposition 1 Thermal power is consumed after having consumed all available water in the
reservoir: xt > 0 ) ct = zt.
The social planner aims at maximizing total electricity production at the lowest possible
cost. Hydroelectricity production is limited by the dam's capacity and has a random availability,
therefore thermal electricity, even if it is costly, allows to soften these features. The result proved
in Proposition 1 means that the electricity consumption path can be decomposed into two phases.
The cheapest energy source is consumed rst. Once the water reserve is fully depleted, thermal
power is produced in combination with the water in
ow. The driving force for this result is the
willingness of the social planner to postpone energy expenditure because  < 1.
Proof: Suppose the results does not hold: xt > 0 and ct < zt. Let t0 be the rst time
period for which ct0 > 0 (it exists else constraint (4) would be violated). Consider the following
strategy
- fb ct; b xtg with b ct = ct + "
R and b xt = xt   ",
- fb ct+1; b xt+1g with b ct0 = ct0   "
R and b xt0 = xt0 + ".
ut = ut+1  ut = p and ut0 = ut0+1  ut0 =  p. Therefore, the total eect on the whole time





is strictly positive, and strategy fb c; b xg is strictly
preferred to strategy fc;xg that is the optimal one. This leads to a contradiction. 2
6In the light of this result, to solve the initial maximization program, I rst determine the
optimal consumption of thermal power in the second stage of the process, that is, when the dam
is empty. I then use this information to determine the optimal consumption of hydroelectricity
in the rst stage. To do so, I introduce function
b u(Rc;p) = max
x0
u(Rc + x)   px: (8)
Lemma 1 Let e (p) = u0 1 (p) be the demand for electricity when thermal electricity is the
unique energy source. Function b u is equal to
b u(Rc;p) =

u(e (p))   p(e (p)   Rc) if Rc  e (p),
u(Rc) if Rc  e (p).
Thus
x(t) = max(e (p)   Rc(t);0);
and demand for electricity is higher than or equal to e (p).
Proof: If  is the Lagrangian multiplier associated to the constraint x  0, the FOC reads
u0 (Rc + x)   p +  = 0. With e = u0 1 (p), two cases occur:
- either  = 0, what implies x  0. It follows that u0 (Rc + x) = p = u0 (e); x = e  Rc 
0; and Rc  e,
- or  > 0, what implies x = 0 and u0 (Rc + x) = p    < u0 (e); x = 0; and Rc > e.
The shape of ^ u is straightforward. 2
b u is represented in Figure 2. When c  e (p)=R, it is a straight line and once this threshold

























Figure 2: Indirect utility function b u








zt+1 = zt   ct + e yt+1; (10)
ct  zt; (11)
ct  zt   Z; (12)
ct  0; (13)
z0 given. (14)
Before I characterize the solution of this program, I study, as a benchmark, the case without
uncertainty on the water in
ow.
3 Benchmark: model under certainty
The water in
ow that lls the dam at each period is assumed to be constant: 8t; e yt = y > 0.
Total consumption is at each period greater or equal than y: 8t;ct  y and constraint (13) is
thus always satised.
Lemma 2 Without uncertainty on the water in
ow, water consumption is decreasing until the
dam is empty. Afterwards, it equals the water in
ow. Thermal electricity is consumed if and
only if the water in
ow is not sucient to satisfy demand e (p).
The dierent cases are represented in Table 1.
electricity (from water) electricity (from thermal power)
y > e (p)=R x = 0 c is decreasing until y and constant afterwards
y  e (p)=R and x is strictly positive c is decreasing until y
z0  e (p)=R once c reaches e (p)=R and constant afterwards
y  e (p)=R and x is positive c is decreasing until y
z0 < e (p)=R from the rst period on and constant afterwards
Table 1: Electricity consumption paths
Proof: According to Lemma 1, at each time period, electricity consumption is at least equal
to e (p). Two cases may occur:
- either y < zt  e (p)R: there remains a strictly positive quantity of water in the dam
before the precipitation replenishes the reservoir (wt > 0),
- or zt = y  e (p)=R: there is no water stock in the dam any more and at each time period,
water consumption is equal to the rainfall. x(t) + Rc(t) > e (p) implies that no thermal
power is consumed (x(t) = 0) and electricity is produced using only the hydroelectric
technology.
Optimal thermal power consumption path is therefore equal to x(t) = max(e (p)   Rc(t);0).
2
In this case, one of the limit of hydroelectricity, its random availability, is eliminated, and the
unique constraint consists in its stock capacity. However, this stock limit only applies when the
8initial quantity of water in the dam is very high (when z0 > Z   y), and in this case, the social
planner consumes all the surplus in the rst time period and the water in
ow afterwards. In
the certain case as in the general case, thermal electricity is consumed when the dam is empty.
But in the certain case, c is a decreasing function of time. The resolution of the program is
in Appendix A. I present the shape of the optimal water consumption path in Figure 3. 
 is
taken to be equal to 5. This is consistent with the estimation of the price elasticity for dierent
European countries found in S oderholm (2001) whose mean amounts to -0.2. The constant in
ow
of water, y, is equal to 2. Concerning the other parameters, the values chosen are  = 0:95,
R = 0:7, Z = 10, z0 = 10 and p = 0:05. e (p) is therefore equal to 1:82.































Figure 3: Optimal power consumption path
In order to be able to draw comparisons with the case where the water in
ow is uncertain
(see following section), I give the shape of the water consumption 
ow c relative to the quantity
of available water z in Figure 4.



































Figure 4: Optimal water consumption path as a function of the quantity of water available
9There is a kink: indeed, for low levels of stored water, all the available water is consumed.
Afterwards, this is a step function because of the denition of the time T from which thermal
power is consumed. As I work in discrete time, T has to be integer. I focus now on the general
case.
4 General case: model with uncertainty
I assume now that each realization of the random variable e yt is positive meaning that zt > min e y,
8t. The resolution of problem (9) is made more convenient by using the Bellman equation
v (z) = max
c
fb u(Rc) + Ev (z   c + e y)g (15)
subject to
c  z; (16)
c  z   Z; (17)
c  0: (18)
The following lemma gives a rst result on the shape of the value function v.
Lemma 3 The value function v is concave.
Proof: See the Appendix. 2
This technical result is a rst step before obtaining results on the shape of both consumption






 Ev0 (z + e y   c) if (16) is binding,
 Ev0 (z + e y   c) if (17) or (18) is binding,
= Ev0 (z + e y   c) otherwise.
The second order condition, @2L
@c2 = R2b u00 (Rc)+Ev00 (z + e y   c)  0, is satised because of the
concavity of u and v.
A temporal study of the consumption 
ows is not possible in the uncertain case. Therefore,
the analysis is conducted focusing on the state variable z. The realization of zt+1 knowing zt is
of course a random variable dependent on the realization of the random water in
ow. There are
two means for the social planner to smooth electricity consumption: consuming thermal power
when water extraction is low or storing water in the dam when precipitation is large. According
to Proposition 1, when water is scarce, the social planner does not use the dam to store water.
He prefers consuming all the water available and smoothing electricity consumption with the
consumption of thermal power. On the contrary, when there is more water in the dam, the social
planner does not use the alternative energy source anymore, but the dam to smooth electricity
consumption.
4.1 Analysis of the water consumption 
ow
I begin this section with a result on the shape of function c.
Lemma 4 Electricity consumption is strictly positive when the quantity of available water is
strictly positive: 8z > 0;c(z) > 0.
10Proof: See the Appendix. 2
The numerical resolution of problem (15) is represented in Figure 5. I consider a random
in
ow e y that takes the values 0, 3 and 6 with equal probabilities, thus 8t;zt  0.



































Figure 5: Consumption of water as a function of the quantity of available water when e y 2 f0;3;6g
There are two thresholds z and z such that
- 8z  z; c(z) = z,
- 8z  z; c(z) = z   Z.3
Proposition 2 The following property holds:
z  e (p)=R: (19)
Proof: Suppose this is not the case and let  z 2 ]z;e (p)=R[:
- since  z > z, c(z) < z and there remains water in the reservoir,
- since z < e (p)=R, according to Lemma 1, x( z) = e (p)=R   c(z) > e (p)=R   z > 0.
This implies that thermal power is consumed whereas there remains water in the reservoir. This
contradicts Proposition 1. 2











; c(z) = z; and x(z) = 0;
 8z  z; x(z) = 0; and c(z)is the solution of Rb u0 (Rc) = Ev0 (z   c + e y)+ ;
3The existence of z
 has already been proven by Deaton (1991) and Deaton and Laroque (1992, 1996). In
Deaton's model studying the consumption/saving behavior of agents, there is only one constraint on the maximal
amount that can be borrowed which corresponds to (16).
11where  and  are the Lagrange multipliers associated with constraints (16) and (17):4
In order to understand how hydroelectricity consumption smoothing is possible for dierent
levels of stored water, I compute the marginal propensity to consume @c=@z from the rst order
condition. It is a measure of the eciency of intertemporal smoothing going from 0 in case of a







1 if z  z,
Ev00(z+e y c(z))
R2b u00(Rc(z))+Ev00(z+e y c(z)) if z < z < z,
1 if z  z.
First, c0(z) is positive implying that c is an increasing function. Next, note that when neither
(16) nor (17) is binding, the marginal propensity to consume is strictly less than 1 and time
diversication is possible:
- when z < z, the reservoir is emptied out. Either thermal power is consumed or, when
z 2 [e (p)=R;Z], the social planner knows that at the next time period there will be a
water in
ow greater or equal then min e y, there is thus no need to keep water in stock,
- when z 2 [z;z], as the social planner knows that in the future he could not produce
the quantity of water he would like, he prefers cutting down on production today to let
enough water in the dam for the future,5
- when z  z, the social planner increases hydroelectricity production because of the risk
of a very rainy period for many successive periods.
Note that the marginal propensity to consume is rst decreasing and then increasing. There-
fore, function c is successively concave then convex.6
It is also meaningful to look at the evolution of hydroelectricity production over time. In
Figure 6, the consumption 
ow for 100 time periods is represented together with the water stock.
It has been obtained with a simulation of the random variable e y (in this numerical illustration,
I consider the extreme case where p ! +1, meaning that thermal energy is not available).
The path of water consumption has a completely dierent shape than under certainty where
it was a decreasing function of time. Observe that the variations in the consumption 
ow are
smaller than the stock variations: consumption smoothing is ecient.
4.2 Description of the thermal energy consumption 
ow
Once the water consumption 
ow is known, thermal power consumption is equal x(z) = max(e(p) 
Rz;0) (see Lemma 1 and Proposition 2). The production of thermal power decreases linearly
with z from e (p) down to 0.
4.3 Comparative static relative to price
The following lemma provides a rst result on the evolution of thermal power consumption with
respect to price.
4Lemma 4 tells that constraint c  0 in program (15) is never binding when z > 0.
5In the case where p ! +1 (the alternative energy source is not available), it can be shown that z
  min ~ y
(see Appendix C).
6The dierence with the concavity result of the consumption function proven by Carroll and Kimball (1996)
comes from the second constraint: consumption has to be high enough in our model.
120 1 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0 1 0 0
water stock water consumption
Figure 6: Evolution of the stock and of the consumption with time
Lemma 5 For a given level of available water in the dam z, thermal electricity production is
decreasing with p.
Proof: It is straightforward knowing that e (p) is a decreasing function of p and that
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Figure 7: Consumption of water as a function of the quantity of available water for dierent p
The numerical resolution reveals that c(z;p) is decreasing with p: for a given level of water
in the reservoir, when the price of the alternative electricity source increases, hydroelectricity
production decreases. This result could appear as counterintuitive since the social planner does
not take advantage of the cost decrease of the thermal technology to increase his water con-
sumption. On the contrary, he even decreases it. Remember that this is a dynamic problem and
that the main concern is to be able to produce enough electricity to face a potential unfavorable
future. But when p increases, one means to smooth electricity consumption is less ecient.
Indeed, when p increases, the social planner knows that thermal power production is going to
13decrease (see Lemma 5). That is why, for a given value of z, he prefers decreasing hydroelectric-
ity production in order to keep water stock for the future. This shift of the consumption 
ow
when the price of the second energy source increases expresses a precautionary behavior of the
social planner. Moreover note that as p decreases, @c=@z decreases: the existence of thermal
power at a low price improves intertemporal diversication even when the fossil source is not
consumed (for values of z such that e (p)   Rz = 0).
Table 2 presents the proportion of thermal power and water in the total amount of electricity
consumed for dierent values for p. These values have been obtained by simulating the random
variable e y 10000 times: one obtains a path for the water stock for 10000 periods and consequently
both consumption 
ows.






Table 2: Proportion of hydroelectricity and thermal power in the total consumption for dierent
values for p
As p decreases, the proportion of thermal power increases and the proportion of hydroelec-
tricity decreases. This happens in an exponential way. This result completes the result on
the precautionary behavior of the social planner developed at the beginning of the subsection.
When p increases, although, for a given quantity z of available water, the social planner reduces
hydroelectricity production to keep water in stock for the future, the share of hydroelectricity
production relative to thermal power production increases.
To conclude this paragraph on the comparative statics with respect to price, I state the
following result
Lemma 6 The value function v decreases with p.
Proof: See the Appendix. 2
This result highlights the link between the two energy sources: when the price of thermal
electricity increases, the dam is more valuable and v increases.
4.4 Comparative static relative to uncertainty
To study the impact of an increase in uncertainty of the water in
ow on electricity production,
I write the random in
ow as the sum of a constant random term and a zero mean random
variable: e y = y + e ". I consider three cases: one without uncertainty and the other with two
random variables e "1 and e "2 such that
2
1 = V ar(e "1) < 2
2 = V ar(e "2): (20)
In Figure 8, the three consumption 
ows are represented for value of z close to z.
When z is close to z, the more uncertainty, the higher the consumption level. The social
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Figure 8: Water consumption for dierent uncertainty levels when the dam is almost empty
when he is close to empty out the reservoir, he does not reduce his consumption, meaning that
he does not adopt a prudent behavior. According to Leland (1968), in a nite horizon setting,
an agent is prudent (in the sense where he consumes less today and saves more) if and only if
the marginal utility of future consumption is convex. The following lemma adapts this result
to this context in the special case where there are two random variables e "1 and e "2 such that
e "1 = f ";";0:5;0:5g and e "2 = f ";";0:5;0:5g with " < ".
Lemma 7 The social planner is prudent if and only if
"

@2v (z   c2 + y + ";2)
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Proof: See the Appendix. 2
When the social planner is prudent, the RHS of (21) is negative. Therefore, the condition
of the lemma is satised when v0 is convex (the LHS of (21) is positive) or when v0 is not too
concave. But no general result holds that links the shape of v0 and the prudence of the social
planner. When z is close to z, b u0 is locally concave implying that v0 is locally concave too
(see Figure 8).7 Inequality (21) is not satised in this case and the social planner does not
adopt a prudent behavior. What is the intuition for the result? Imagine the system is such that
the quantity of water at the beginning of the period is close to z. According to the optimal
consumption rule, before rainfalls ll the dam, it is almost empty. Two realizations of the
random variable may occur:
- the bad state of nature occurs.
The rainfalls are too low to reach a hydroelectricity consumption level equal to e (p)=R.
The dam is thus totally emptied out. There is no precautionary saving in this case, and
the increase in uncertainty does not in
uence the consumption policy of the social planner.
- the good state of nature occurs.
The water stock is thus higher in the case of higher uncertainty and water consumption is
also higher.
7Note that the envelope theorem implies that v
0 (z) = Rb u
0 (c(z)).
15The increase in uncertainty is thus rather a good news when the system is such that z is close to
z and the social planner increases thus consumption. But this does not hold for all the possible
states z. Indeed for other values of z, v0 is convex and equation (21) is satised, meaning that the
social planner prevents from uncertainty by reducing his consumption. Moreover the numerical
simulation reveals that the value function decreases with uncertainty.
Note that this result on the social planner's prudence is close to the one obtained by Hoel
[11]. Indeed he studied the optimal exhaustible resource extraction when the future substitute
has an uncertain cost. He found that if the marginal utility of future consumption is concave,
an increase in cost's uncertainty leads to an increase in the extraction rate.
I now turn to the analysis of the optimal size of an electric park composed of two energy
sources.
5 What is the optimal infrastructure?
I rst introduce the number of dams as a parameter in program (15)8
v (z;;p) = max
c;x fu(Rc + x)   px + Ev (z   c + e y;;p)g (22)
subject to
c  z; (23)
c  z   Z; (24)
x  0: (25)
Variable  stands for the number of dams. If  dams are used, the total 
ow of water that lls
then amounts to e y and the total capacity is equal to Z. e y and Z are exogenous parameters.
As  increases, two eects appear:
- as  increases, it is as if the dam's capacity increased. Consumption smoothing should
thus be more ecient leading to an increase in the value of the electric park.
- as  increases, the quantity of rainfalls that lls the dams increases also. The value of the
electric park also increases.
Figure 9 conrms this intuition: v increases with . Moreover, as p increases, v (0;;p) in-
creases: the two goods, dams and thermal electricity, are substitutes indeed. I also note that
@v (0;;p)=@ is a decreasing function of p: the dam's marginal value increases with the cost
of thermal electricity.
To obtain the optimal number of dams, the social planner solves
max
0
v (0;;p)   C () (26)
subject to the participation constraint
























is the utility without hydroelectricity.
With a linear cost function, the numerical resolution whose results are reported in Table 3
reveals that  (p) is an increasing function of p.
8I choose to focus on the optimal number of dams although other interpretations would have been possible





























Figure 9: Utility obtained from empty dams: v (0;;p) for dierent thermal power prices
p number of dams number of dams





Table 3: Optimal number of dams for dierent values for p
When thermal power price increases, it is optimal to build more dams. However, when
p is low and thus thermal electricity quite cheap, the participation constraint is not satised
anymore. Hydroelectricity is not used anymore since the xed costs are too high. Note that when
uncertainty increases, the number of dams also increases although v decreases with uncertainty
(see the previous section). This may be due to the capacity increases it provides.
6 Extensions
In this part, I suppose that a third energy source is available, wind energy for instance. I focus
on hydro power and wind power. Indeed, I know from section 2 that introducing thermal power
will be equivalent to using utility function b u instead of utility function u.
Suppose the social planner can provide hydroelectricity and wind electricity. The dam is
supplied with a random in
ow. Wind energy is also random. Two cases occur: either there is
no wind, in which case no wind electricity can be consumed (which happens with probability
q), or there is wind and the quantity of wind electricity amounts to W (which happens with
probability (1   q)). Let c0 (respectively c1) be the water consumption 
ow when wind electricity
is available (respectively not available) and v0 (z) (respectively v1 (z) ) be the value function when





v0 (z) = maxc0 u(Rc0) +  [qEv0 (z   c0 + e y) + (1   q)Ev1 (z   c0 + e y)]
subject to c0  z;c0  0;c0  z   Z;




+  [qEv0 (z   c1 + e y) + (1   q)Ev1 (z   c1 + e y)]
subject to c1  z;c1  0;c1  z   Z:
I denote 0, 0 and 0 (resp. 1, 1 and 1) the three Lagrange multipliers associated
with the constraints that apply to c0 (resp. c1). I rst have some results on the shape of the
consumption 
ows.
Lemma 8 Consumption 
ows c0 (z) and c1 (z) have the following properties:
1. 8z > 0;c0 (z) > 0,
2. if c1 (z) = 0, then Rc0 (z) < W,
3. if c1 (z) = z, then c0 (z) = z. The opposite is not true,
4. if c0 (z) = z   Z, then c1 (z) = z   Z. Once more, the opposite is not true.
Proof: See the Appendix. 2
Note that the constraint c0 (z)  0 can be omitted. When there is no wind, as soon as
there is a strictly positive quantity of available water, it is consumed. Unlike the case without
wind power, c1 (z) might be equal to zero even when the quantity of available water is strictly
positive. Indeed, when there is wind power, the social planner is tempted to keep water in
stock for the future in case wind power and/or precipitation are low the following time period.
Thus, when z is very low, he prefers not producing hydropower. However, this only happens
for some quantity of available water z such that if there were no wind, the total quantity of
hydroelectricity produced would be less than the quantity of wind electricity W. This means
that, when the quantity of available water is high enough, water is consumed whatever the
quantity of wind power. The last two results represent a rst step completed with the following
proposition. They allow a preliminary ranking of both consumption 
ows c0 and c1 when one
of the constraints is binding.
Proposition 3 For any level of available water in the dam z:
1. hydroelectricity consumption is higher when there is no wind: c1 (z)  c0 (z),
2. electricity consumption is higher when there is wind: Rc0 (z)  Rc1 (z) + W.
Proof: See the Appendix. 2
When wind power is available, the social planner prefers saving water and taking advantage
of wind power. However, total electricity consumption is higher when there is wind power. The
two consumption 
ows c0 (z) and c1 (z) are represented in Figure 10.
The introduction of this third energy source that is random but non-storable increases elec-
tricity consumption but does not produce a visible eect on time diversication. Indeed the
slope of c0 (z) is not very dierent from the slope of c1 (z) (see Figure 10).





























Figure 10: Consumption 
ows c0 (z) and c1 (z)
7 Concluding remarks
I study the optimal allocation between dierent energy sources that are uncertain. When only
hydroelectricity is available, the main objective of water management is to limit the volatility of
electricity consumption coming from the uncertain precipitation. Dams should thus be used as
a buer stock. The rst model aims at determining the optimal strategy of water extraction. I
show that the optimal extraction strategy is a function of the quantity z of water that is available
to the consumer. It is characterized by two thresholds z and z. When the water stock is
smaller than z, the social planner is rationed by the limited amount of water in the dam. If the
water stock is greater than z, the social planner immediately consumes the surplus that comes
from the random water 
ow that lls the dam in order not to waste water. If the water stock
is in the interval [z;z], the marginal propensity to consume, @c=@z, is positive and strictly
less than 1, expressing the intertemporal smoothing of hydroelectricity consumption. The social
planner prefers storing water in the dam in order to face a potential unfavorable future in case
of low levels of precipitation.
The introduction of a second energy source improves intertemporal smoothing. When the
price of this alternative energy source decreases, the marginal propensity to consume electricity
decreases, illustrating an improvement of the time diversication eect. This result even holds on
ranges of the water stock for which hydroelectricity is the only energy source that is consumed.
Indeed, with two energy sources, there exists a minimum level of electricity that is produced at
each period and thermal power is used to reach this level when there is not enough water. But as
soon as the quantity of water is sucient to reach or to exceed this level, the social planner does
not use the costly energy source any more and prefers consuming water exclusively. Moreover
the presence of thermal power shifts up the consumption 
ow. Indeed, when the price of thermal
power increases, the social planner adopts a precautionary behavior. He prefers producing less
to constitute a greater stock for the future.
The optimal capacity of the total infrastructure is increasing with the thermal power price.
The less thermal power is produced (what occurs when p is high), the more dams are needed to
smooth consumption.
19The introduction of a second uncertain energy source that is not storable allows to increase
hydroelectricity consumption for a given quantity of available water. However, water consump-
tion smoothing is not signicantly increased since the new energy source is uncertain. It is the
certain availability of thermal energy that allows to improve time diversication.
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A Computation of the optimal consumption 
ows in the certain
case (Section 2)
I present the computations in two cases.
Case 1: y  e (p)=R and z0  e (p)=R:






tu(Rc(t)) + T+1 [u(e (p))   p(e (p)   Rc(T + 1))]  
+1 X
t=T+2
t (u(e (p)))   p(e (p)   Ry))
subject to













c(T + 1)  y;
z0 given.
The rst constraint is the usual one on the dynamics of available water, the second inequality means
that at time T, no thermal power is consumed yet. The third equation means that at time T + 1, the
dam is completely emptied out. Indeed, if it was not the case, water would remain in the dam in period
T +1. Therefore, no thermal power would be consumed in this time period what would not be consistent
with the denition of T. The fourth inequality means that at time T + 1, thermal power is consumed
21and the last equality ensures that until T, no more water than the quantity stored in the dam has been
consumed.









 c(T) if t  T;










 if t = T + 1;
y if t  T + 2;
where T is the lowest integer t such that

































































 c(T) if t  T;
y if t  T + 1;

































B Computation of the value function v in the certain case (Sec-
tion 2)




The water consumption path has the following expression (as I already noted in section 2, this amounts
























In this case, in the rst period, all the water is consumed and thermal power is consumed in order
to reach e (p). In the following periods, water is consumed in quantity y and thermal power in
quantity e (p)   Ry. Therefore, the value function takes the following form:
v (z) = u(e (p))   p(e (p)   Rz) +
+1 X
t=1





























The only dierence with the previous case is that no thermal power is consumed in the initial
period because there is enough water:
v (z) = u(Rz) +
+1 X
t=1


























In this case there are three periods:
- until period T, only water is consumed,
- in period T + 1, all the water that remains in the dam is consumed and thermal power is
consumed to reach the level e (p) of electricity,
- from period T + 2 on, there is no water in the dam any more. Only the consumption 
ow y
is consumed, therefore thermal power is consumed in quantity e (p)   Ry.

















































































A if z > y;
z else:
Following the same steps than above, I compute the value function for the dierent value taken by





In this case, thermal power and water are consumed in the initial period, and from the second
period on, water is only consumed in quantity y.






















R < z < y:
Here also, the only dierence with the previous case is that in the rst period, no thermal power
23is consumed. But, from the second period on, the consumption path is the same.



















3. z > y:










































Lemma 9 When p ! +1, the threshold z is higher than the minimum water in
ow min e y.
Proof: Suppose this result does not hold: min e y > z. Denoting z = min e y and c = c(z), this leads
to c < z. The FOC leads to
Ru0 (Rc) = Ev0 (z   c + e y);
< v0 (2z   c);
< v0 (z) (since c < z),
< v0 (z);
= Ru0 (Rc) (envelope theorem).
Therefore, min e y  z. 2
D Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3:
I apply Theorem 9.8 page 265 in Stokey and Lucas [19]. All the assumptions are satised:
1. X =

0;Z + max e y

is a convex subset of R,
2. e y is a discrete random variable that takes a nite number of values: e y 2 fy1;y2;:::;yng,
3. the correspondence   : X ! X describing the feasibility constraints is non empty, compact valued
and continuous (see Figure 11),
4. b u(x) is bounded and continuous, and  < 1,
5. b u is concave (
 < 1),
6.   is convex (see Figure 11).
Thus, according to Theorem 9.8 p. 265 of Stokey and Lucas [19], function v is concave.
Proof of Lemma 4:
Suppose that there exists z0 > 0 such that c(z0) = 0. In this case, constraint (16) does not bind and
the FOC reads
Rb u0 (Rc(z0))  Ev0 (z0   c(z0) + e y);
= Ev0 (z0 + e y);
 v0 (z0)because v is concave,
< v0 (z0)because  < 1,
= Rb u0 (Rc(z0))because of the envelope theorem.
24Z+max y Z z
Γ
Figure 11: Correspondence  
Therefore, there is a contradiction and c(z0) > 0 (and eventually that constraint (16) binds leading to
c(z0) = z0 > 0). 2
Proof of Lemma 6:
Consider p1 < p0 and recall that





t (u(Rct + xt)   pxt)
subject to
zt+1 = zt   ct + e yt;
ct  zt;
ct  zt   Z;
xt  0:
Consider the optimal policy c (z;p0) and x (z;p0) at price p0. This allocation is feasible at price p1.
Therefore,
v (z;p0)  E
+1 X
t=0




t (u(Rc (z;p1) + x (z;p1))   p1x (z;p1));
= v (z;p1):
2
Proof of Lemma 7:
To prove this result I thus focus on two random variables e "1 and e "2 such that e "1 = f ";";0:5;0:5g
and e "2 = f ";";0:5;0:5g with " < ". I dene
H (c1;1) = R^ u(Rc1)   Ev0 (z   c1 + y + e "1;1):
c2 dened by R^ u(Rc2) Ev0 (z   c2 + y + e "2;2) = 0 is lower than c1 (the social planner is prudent) if
and only if H (c2;1) > 0.
H (c2;1) = R^ u(Rc2)   Ev0 (z   c2 + y + e "1;1)




H (c2;1) = v0 (z   c2 + y + ";2)   v0 (z   c2 + y + ";2) + v0 (z   c2 + y + ";2)   v0 (z   c2 + y + ";1) +
+ v0 (z   c2 + y   ";2)   v0 (z   c2 + y   ";2) + v0 (z   c2 + y   ";2)   v0 (z   c2 + y   ";1):
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@z2 + 
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The social planner is prudent if and only if
"

@2v (z   c2 + y + ";2)
@z2  





@2v (z   c2 + y + ";2)
@@z
+





Proof of Lemma 8:
I successively successively prove the four assertions.
1. Suppose there exists z0 > 0 such that c0 (z0) = 0. This implies that y0  0. The FOC of the
maximization program leads to
Ru0 (Rc0) =  [qEv0
0 (z0   c0 + e y) + (1   q)Ev0
1 (z0   c0 + e y)]   y0;
  [qEv0
0 (z0   c0 + e y) + (1   q)Ev0
1 (z0   c0 + e y)];
< qv0
0 (z0) + (1   q)v0
1 (z0)because v is concave,
= qRu0 (c0) + (1   q)Ru0  
Rc1 + W

because of the envelope theorem.
This leads to Rc0 = 0 > Rc1 + W what is not possible since c1  0. Therefore, the constraint
c0 (z)  0 never binds for strictly positive z and y0 = 0.





0 (z0 + e y) + (1   q)Ev0
1 (z0 + e y);




This leads to Rc0 (z0) < W.
3. I suppose c1 (z) = z and c0 (z) < z.




0 (e y) + (1   q)Ev0
1 (e y)] + 1. c0 (z) < z implies that
Ru0 (Rc0) =  [qEv0
0 (z   c0 + e y) + (1   q)Ev0
1 (z   c0 + e y)];
  [qEv0










The concavity of function u implies that Rc0  Rz + W, what cannot happen. Therefore, there is
a contradiction and c0 (z) = z.









Z + e y

+ (1   q)v0
1
 
Z + e y






0 (z   c1 + e y) + (1   q)v0






Z + e y

+ (1   q)v0
1
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This leads to W < 0, a contradiction. Therefore, c1 (z) = z   Z. 2
26Proof of Proposition 3:
Concerning the rst result, suppose by contradiction there exists z0 such that c0 (z0) < c1 (z0).
When neither constraint is binding and by the concavity of u, this implies that: Ru0 (Rc0 (z0)) >
Ru0  
Rc1 (z0) + W

. Depending on the rst order conditions:
q [Ev0
0 (z0   c0 (z0) + e y)   Ev0
0 (z0   c1 (z0) + e y)] > (1   q)[Ev0
1 (z0   c1 (z0) + e y)   Ev0
1 (z0   c0 (z0) + e y)]:
As c0 (z0) < c1 (z0) and as z 7! v0 (z;0) is a decreasing function, the left hand side is strictly negative.
Similarly, the right hand side is strictly positive and this leads to a contradiction.
When one of the constraint is binding, I know according to the results of Lemma 8 that c1 (z)  c0 (z).
Concerning the second point, suppose there exists z1 such that Rc0 (z1) > Rc1 (z1) + W. When
neither constraint is binding, this implies that: Ru0 (Rc1 (z1) + W) > Ru0 (Rc0 (z1)), and therefore:
(1   q)[Ev0
0 (z1   c1 (z1) + e y)   Ev0
0 (z1   c0 (z1) + e y)] > q [Ev0
1 (z1   c0 (z1) + e y)   Ev0
1 (z1   c1 (z1) + e y)].
Once more, the assumptions imply that the left hand side is strictly negative and the right hand side
strictly positive, there is a contradiction.
I consider rapidly the cases where one of the constraints is binding:
- If c1 (z) = 0, then according to the previous lemma, Rc0 (z) < W.





0 (e y) + (1   q)Ev0
1 (e y)]
= Ru0 (Rc0)   0
< Ru0 (Rc0)
Therefore, Rc1 + W > Rc0.
- If c1 (z) = z   Z and c0 (z) > z   Z, a similar reasoning leads to the result. 2
27